Don’t Misunderestimate the Strategery – It’s Stay the Course!

Our first MBA president has taken the Drucker principle of management by objectives and turned it on its head. President Bush has instead managed by strategy and manipulated the objectives to fit the strategy. This has clearly been the case with his Iraq policy, where the president has used a very nebulous and ill-defined strategy, which has been consistently referred to as “staying the course.” And yet, the objectives in Iraq have been frequently manipulated – from finding WMD, then establishing democracy, to defeating the insurgency, etc. – all to fit the same adamant “stay the course” strategy.

In the first year of the war, the objective was pretty much to find Iraq’s WMD and President Bush was determined to “stay the course” until they were found. Following David Kay’s shocking “I don’t think they existed” revelation in January 2004 about Iraq’s WMD, and the Iraq Survey Group’s subsequent confirmation of the same, President Bush changed his objective for Iraq. Following his own reelection, and with Iraqis then voting in their first elections, President Bush’s objective for Iraq became,

“a free, representative government that is an ally in the war on terror, and a beacon of hope in a part of the world that is desperate for reform.”

Alas, his strategy to get there remained essentially to “stay the course.”

Even more unfortunately, a month before President Bush stated this new lofty goal for Iraq, Vice President Cheney had already predicated “staying the course” by dismissing a growing insurgency as being “in its last throes.” In early 2006 a critical Shiite mosque in Samara was torched and much of central Iraq was overwhelmed by violence. So the Bush Administration changed its objective in Iraq yet again. The objective was no longer to build a liberal democracy but to focus on defeating a raging insurgency. Regrettably, the strategy to get there was essentially a “clear, hold, and build” version of “stay the course,” in the sense that it relied on Iraq’s notoriously unreliable security forces to do the “hold and build” part.

Meanwhile “staying the course” in Iraq for almost four years without tangible results did not go down well with the American public. So they expressed their displeasure in the 2006 mid-term elections by voting the president’s party out of power from both chambers in Congress. Shortly after, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) issued its recommendations and endorsed President Bush’s new post-election strategic goal for an Iraq that could

“govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.”

However, President Bush chose not to implement the ISG’s methodology of getting there. Instead in January 2007, President Bush finally announced a new “surge” strategy to be executed under the auspices of General Petraeus.

The new “surge” strategy relied on 30,000 more American troops to “clear, hold, and build” in and around Baghdad so as to bring down the violence and thus give Iraqis a chance at political reconciliation. Fortunately, even before the “surge” started, it benefited from unexpected success in the western Iraqi province of Anbar, where the local population turned against Al Qaeda insurgents. But sadly, the political apparatus in Baghdad far from reconciling began to fall apart as Sunni and Shia leaders began to desert the Al-Maliki government at regular intervals throughout the spring and summer.

By its very definition, a surge is a temporary phenomenon and hence the gains that come with it can also be transitory. The pockets of peace that have been established in the tribal areas of Iraq should thus be celebrated with caution. These nomadic desert tribes have had a history of transient and shifting loyalties. Nonetheless, to maintain these gains on the periphery, a strong central uniting force is absolutely critical. If an Iraqi Prime Minister is incapable of holding the center, a lasting peace will never come to Baghdad, and Iraq will eventually break apart.

Prior to the much anticipated Petraeus Report to Congress on September 10th, a couple of other independent sources, such as the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Jones Commission also released their findings on post-surge Iraq. The GAO found that

“Iraq has failed to meet 11 of the 18 military and political objectives, or benchmarks, set by Congress and agreed on by Mr. Bush,”

according to a New York Times report dated September 4th. A couple of days later, Retired Marine Gen. James Jones presented his commission’s conclusions to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Per a NPR report,

“while Gen. Jones noted that there have been what he called ‘tactical successes’ with the U.S. troop surge, he said that Iraq remains torn by sectarian strife.”

Then, on the sixth anniversary of 9/11, General Petraeus testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee with his take on the “surge.” This is how ABC News reported one telling exchange between Senator John Warner and General Petraeus:

“Are you able to say at this time if we continue what you’ve laid before the Congress here as a strategy do you feel that is making America safer?” Warner asked.

“Sir, I believe that this is indeed the best course of action to achieve our objectives in Iraq,” Petraeus said.

“Does that make America safer?” Warner asked again.

“Sir,” Petraeus said, “I don't know actually.”

For having put General Petraeus in a position where he had to give such an answer, President Bush ought to feel ashamed. President Bush could not very well have made such a candid assessment himself, so he chose to hide behind General Petraeus. It is an even bigger shame that President Bush is thus politicizing our military by using its officers to effectively prolong his failed Iraq policy.

Following the 2006 mid-term elections and the subsequent Iraq Study Group report, President Bush made a gullible American public believe that his “surge” strategy would be different and its primary purpose would be to meet political objectives in Iraq. The “surge” has more or less given us the same old, same old. Nonetheless, President Bush and his die-hard supporters are intent on moving “forward to the past,” which is basically the same as “staying the course.” While the rest of us want to go “back to the future,” in which we could finally “give peace a chance.”

In an ironic case of real life imitating art, it is as if President Bush has all along been pleading with us not to “misunderestimate the strategery.” But seriously, how long can he muddle along in Iraq without further weakening our overstretched Army and Marines? How many more times are we going to hear that “the next six months are critical?” With no exit strategy in sight, when President Bush finally leaves office in January 2009, he is on track to leave behind not only a stalemate in Iraq, but also a broken military – that would be some legacy, indeed!

Saving President Bush

While answering a question relating to the “war on terror” in August 2004, President Bush told Matt Lauer on NBC’s “Today” show,

“I don’t think you can win it. But I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world — let's put it that way.”

With his then reelection a little over two months away, the President soon backtracked on the “cannot win it” part.

In September 2006 the New York Times published part of a leaked National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report, which suggested that the war in Iraq had only made the terrorism problem worse? Shortly after 9/11 and prior to the start of the Iraq war, the Bush Administration’s rhetoric was nowhere as critical of and as closely tied to the religious aspects of the “war on terror”. It is apparent that the Administration’s increasingly pointed linkage of Islam to terror has been directly proportional to the deteriorating situation in Iraq. In the lead up to the 2006 elections, we heard new phrases such as “Islamo-fascist”, “Islamic Caliphate”, “Islamic Totalitarianism”, “Islamism” enter the public consciousness. Such linkages inflamed not only the faithful but also the long dormant – as has been evidenced by the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

President Bush must surely know that there are over one billion Muslims in the world, totaling nearly one-sixth of humanity. He cannot continue to associate their religion with historically unpopular political dogma such as fascism, totalitarianism, caliphates, etc. and still expect to “create conditions” that come even remotely close to winning a “war on terror”. By conflating religion with politics, President Bush is making his own gut pronouncement to Matt Lauer come true – effectively putting victory, in what he has called the “defining struggle of the 21st century”, out of the western world’s reach.

With a Democratic Congress now ready to take over, we can finally expect some meaningful oversight of the President’s foreign policy. Unfortunately, trying to hold the President accountable for bad policy does not necessarily help make that policy better. One can only hope that the Iraq Study Group’s forthcoming recommendations make some progress in this regard. Nevertheless, I too would like to propose a new strategic direction for the larger foreign policy of the United States – one that I believe will help in saving President Bush. It may not guarantee him an enduring legacy, but I believe my five-point plan will help restore our country’s respect and leadership in the world.

1. Declare an end to the amorphous “global war on terror”.

The “war on terror” has been irrevocably lost, since it has become so clearly demarcated along religious lines both within and outside of Iraq. This is a war that should have never been explicitly declared, much less overtly fought. Following the attacks of 9/11, we knew exactly who its perpetrator (Osama Bin Laden) was and in which country he was based (Afghanistan). It was a no-brainer to declare war on Afghanistan, topple its government (the Taliban), and try to bring this perpetrator to justice.

We also knew that the perpetrator’s organization, Al Qaeda, had a network of terror cells around the world. We even surmised that many of these cells were organized as sleeper cells in various nations that were both friendly and unfriendly to the United States. Thus it should have been obvious that the disparate structure of this terror network would make an overt “war on terror” very difficult to successfully execute on a sustained basis. Following our overt military action in Afghanistan, we should have engaged the remainder of this terror network in a long “silent war” with the help of key western allies. The objective of this silent war would be to root out these terror cells around the world via covert action using “Special Ops” forces as and when required. In fact, I had recommended this “Silent War Doctrine” as a counter to the Bush Doctrine back in December 2001.

The Bush Administration’s conduct of the Iraq war, as a continuation of the global war on terror, has been an unmitigated disaster. Even if this had not been the original intent, it has become apparent that the Iraq war is causing the global war on terror to degenerate into a religious divide between the Judeo-Christian and Muslim worlds. There cannot conceivably be a healthy conclusion to a modern day crusade of this kind – as a result, we need to bring about a quick end to our occupation of Iraq. More importantly, we must find and kill Osama Bin Laden – even if this means reinforcing American troop strength in Afghanistan and engaging the Taliban inside Pakistan. After Osama Bin Laden has been taken “dead or alive”, we should declare an end to the overt global war on terror and let a covert silent war take its place to fulfill our ongoing post-9/11 objectives.

2. Dissolve the “axis of evil” and engage its two recalcitrant members in direct talks.

The reference to “axis of evil” was an unwise piece of rhetoric that should have never seen light of day and I indicated as much in an article that I wrote shortly after President Bush’s 2002 state of the union address, which gave birth to this monstrosity. Bush might have intended to emulate Reagan’s evil empire comparison – but Reagan took on an actual empire, with which there were no religious or theological affiliations to consider. Ironically, the application of the so-called Bush Doctrine to the first member of the axis of evil (Iraq) has resulted in the other two charter members of the axis of evil (Iran & North Korea) actually hastening their respective programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction. With preemptive action against these two nations no longer a viable option, diplomacy can make progress only if these nations are no longer vilified. In the long run, we stand to lose more by not talking directly with Iran and North Korea. If engaging these nations in direct talks requires that we “change our attitude”, we should do so – because it’s time that the Bush Administration realized that substance (producing meaningful outcomes) will eventually trump style (demanding or expecting certain types of behavior from lesser nations). As an indicator of our change in attitude towards Iran, President Bush must offer to re-establish diplomatic relations with Tehran.

3. Initiate “six-party talks” on a divided Iraq.

Shortly after the Biden-Gelb plan on Iraq appeared in the New York Times on May 1st, I endorsed it with the following qualifications in my blog dated May 6th:

“Most of the Biden-Gelb plan for “Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq” makes a lot of sense. However, it did not take into consideration one very important geo-political consideration that is critical to the plan’s success – Iraq’s neighbors. When Saddam was in power he was a constant threat to his neighbors. Once the United States withdraws and with no unifying authoritarian figure in control of Iraq, its neighbors will become a threat to its unity. We cannot forget that Iraq was a country created by the British from disparate nomadic regions. The Turks have had historical issues with the Kurds and Iran will continue to become increasingly influential and meddlesome with the autonomous Shia portion of Iraq. So we need to involve all of Iraq’s neighbors ¬– Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey – upfront in a Dayton-type round of discussions to ensure that the Biden-Gelb plan is destined to succeed.”

Now, more than six months later, I might be so bold as to suggest that the Sunni region of Iraq might want to consider merging with Kuwait to ensure its economic survival – which would be an ironical but fitting twist to Saddam Hussein’s geopolitical mis-adventure of 1990. It is also apparent that the Shia region of Iraq will become a satellite state of Iran, in effect delivering Iran a much-belated victory in its 1980-88 war with Iraq. In order for the Kurdish region to survive a combined Turkish and Iranian threat, we will need to maintain substantial troop strength there for several years – as we have done in South Korea.

4. Appoint President Clinton as Special Ambassador to the Middle East.

There can be no long-term peace in the Middle East until we successfully resolve the Israeli-Palestine problem. President Clinton got very close in 2000 but was betrayed by a greedy Yasser Arafat, who was not happy with the return of 97% of the occupied territories, including joint-control of Jerusalem. With Arafat out of the picture and his Fatah party feuding with Hamas, now might be a good time to mediate a new peace settlement. President Bush can condition his re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran to their intervening with Hamas in the West Bank and Hezbollah in Lebanon. He can then appoint President Clinton as his special ambassador to the region with cabinet rank and full authority to negotiate a 2000-style peace accord.

5. Accept the resignation of Vice President Cheney and appoint a prominent Muslim-American to his cabinet.

President Bush must realize by now that the failure of his foreign policy has been largely due to an aggressive Vice President and his band of neoconservative advisors. The firing of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld can only be the first step in the rejection of a failed “stay the course” strategy. Conservative writer, Peggy Noonan, was on to something when she had headlined a column back in February, “Hit Refresh? Why Bush may be thinking about replacing Cheney.” If he wasn’t thinking about it then, he must do so now – a revised Bush foreign policy has no chance of succeeding in the next two years with its old architect still around. Ms. Noonan was right – a Cheney replacement would have two years to be groomed as a logical successor to President Bush in 2008. John McCain would be a good choice.

Finally, President Bush must appoint a prominent Muslim-American to his cabinet. This would be a terrific gesture to not only the Muslims at home, but it would also show Muslims worldwide that we are a tolerant and inclusive society. There is no vacancy in the cabinet right now, but if someone were to resign, I think such an appointment would go a long way in defusing tensions in the Muslim world more than anything else.