Sunday, December 23, 2007

Avoiding Déjà vu All Over Again In U.S. Foreign Policy

(This article was written during the Thanksgiving weekend, but is only being published now. General Musharraf is now "President" Musharraf - but given the circumstances of his transformation, these titles have no meaningful distinction, so I reproduce my original article as is.)

Since its creation sixty years ago, Pakistan has alternated between democracy and military rule every decade or so. So how many times are we going to watch a rerun of the same old movie, in which the U.S. government chooses to support a military dictatorship in Pakistan with money and arms rather than help its people sustain a liberal democracy? And, we choose to do this because it happens to serve our short-term interests better than it does their long-term future? While Pakistan has always been an invaluable ally in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy from the Kirkpatrick Doctrine of the 1980s to the Bush Doctrine of the 2000s, it invariably ends up as a discarded by-product when these doctrines have run their course.

President Bush must surely make a poor poker player. In June 2001, he misread the "honesty" of Russia's Putin by looking into his eyes to get a sense of his soul, which then subsequently proved to be non-existent. After 9/11 he similarly bought into the "sincerity" of Pakistan's Musharraf, who has also betrayed him by his recent actions. General Musharraf has turned out to be a run-of-the-mill dictator that Pakistan routinely produces every decade or so. Musharraf has repeatedly spoken the anti-terrorism language that Bush likes to hear, while acting consistently in an anti-democratic manner during his illegal reign. In this post-9/11 decade, the Bush Administration has spent almost $10 billion to-date on General Musharraf in the vain hopes that he would actually help us win the "war on terror" against an Al Qaeda-Taliban axis that permeates a significant yet nebulous cross-section of Afghani-Pakistani society.

Meanwhile the Bush Administration has more or less ignored the Pakistani people's ever increasing demands for a more meaningful democracy. Hollywood will soon release "Charlie Wilson's War," a movie which depicts how the U.S. coddled another Pakistani military dictator back in the 1980s – in order to get his support in throwing the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Ironically, after Pakistan had helped the U.S. achieve that important goal in 1989, the elder President Bush rewarded them by withholding deliveries of F-16 fighter jets as necessitated by the 1990 Pressler Amendment. Despite the Pressler sanctions, in 1998 Pakistan defiantly carried out its first nuclear test, which forced President Clinton to impose sanctions on a fragile nation in the waning phase of its democratic decade.

In the post-Soviet 1990s, Pakistan also helped an idling Afghan mujaheddin coalesce into the Taliban, which then usurped power in Afghanistan. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan up until 9/11 with an extremist ideology that included succor for Al Qaeda with the tacit support of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) branch of Pakistan's Army. Following 9/11, President Bush struck a Faustian bargain with Pakistan's relatively new military dictator, General Musharraf. In return for cash, arms, and the support of the U.S. government, President Bush sought Musharraf's assistance in crushing the very same Taliban, which Pakistan's military had previously helped create and flourish! Why the Bush Administration ever deemed this to be a winning proposition boggles the mind?

One of our founding fathers, Benjamin Franklin, had defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. So when is the U.S. foreign policy establishment going to realize that we need to pursue lasting relationships based on our core values and that we should not repeatedly experiment with unprincipled dalliances of convenience? If U.S. foreign policy continues to placate WMD-possessing military dictators, such as Pakistan's Musharraf and North Korea's Kim Jong Il, while sanctioning or attacking WMD-seeking despots, such as Iran's Ahmedinejad and Iraq's now-deceased Saddam Hussein, then we are only going to hasten the WMD acquisition process amongst so-called rogue nations. More importantly, such a dubious policy makes the U.S. lose credibility in the eyes of the world. Especially in the case of Pakistan, which – despite selling its nuclear technology to rogue nations such as Iran, Libya and North Korea – was seen by the world as getting a free pass from the Bush Administration?

Senator Biden was absolutely right when he suggested that the Bush Administration had a tunnel-vision "Musharraf policy" as opposed to a broad-based "Pakistan policy." It is highly likely that if General Musharraf really starts to feel pressured, he will direct his ISI to instigate suicide bombings – not in the Afghan border region, but near the line of control that demarcates India and Pakistan in Kashmir. The Pakistani military has always had this time-tested way to quickly unite Pakistanis and rev up patriotic fervor – by accusing neighboring India of "exploiting" a volatile situation in Pakistan. In fact, General Musharraf could even have his Army engage in a few border skirmishes with India to distract Pakistani attention from his domestic troubles – this too has been done before.

Nonetheless, the U.S. can no longer afford to maintain a double standard in its dealings with Pakistan – seeking to ensure the stability of this nuclear-armed dictatorship in the short-term at the expense of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for its people in the long term – because this will eventually turn out to be a losing proposition for both sides. Sadly, our 1980s paradigm will not help resolve the current crisis in Pakistan. At least back then, Pakistan's military dictator, General Zia, was actually helping us fight a common enemy (the Soviets). This time around, General Musharraf has suppressed the very symbols of Pakistani democracy – judges, lawyers, the media and opposition leaders – while the bad guys (Al Qaeda-Taliban) continue to openly and freely consolidate their strength.

However, it is not too late to refocus U.S. policy in Pakistan towards freedom and democracy – especially since promoting these core American values were the stated objectives of the Bush second term. Such a policy change is all the more imperative because it is the moderate and literate elements of Pakistani society that are clamoring for democracy and the rule of law. The great Pakistani paradox, which demands the reconciling of a functioning liberal democracy with the seemingly conflicting demands of an orthodox Muslim theology, can only be resolved by the duly elected moderate factions in its society. Pakistan could yet become a shining example of a Muslim democracy, provided its military stops intervening every time it foresees or fakes a "crisis." We would much rather have a nuclear-armed Pakistan run by prudent civilians than by an unpredictable army or some of its more extremist elements. This is the only way we can hope to bring real stability to that critical part of the world.

Thus President Bush should refrain from aiding Pakistan's collapse by sending any more ambiguous messages to General Musharraf. He might recall how a similar lack of clarity on the elder Bush’s part prompted Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait in 1990 – the long term repercussions of which President Bush is still dealing with today. In two of the past three decades, military dictators have happened to rule Pakistan when acquiescing Republican presidents have occupied the White House. General Zia received as much support from the Reagan Administration in the 1980s as General Musharraf has from the Bush Administration in the 2000s.

Yet Musharraf must already be looking beyond the Bush presidency. He probably recognizes that if a Democratic Administration takes over from Bush, it will be less tolerant of the status quo in Pakistan. So General Musharraf will try to continue to consolidate his hold on power over the next fourteen months. And, he is doing so by adopting a classic line from the Bush playbook – claiming that he is "temporarily" trading liberty for security in Pakistan's ongoing assistance with Bush’s "war on terror" – which seems to be receiving sympathetic consideration from the Bush Administration.

In a November 2003 address at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush had proclaimed, "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe — because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo."

President Bush must surely realize that as long as our foreign policy continues to accommodate friendly dictators in allied Muslim nations such as Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, we are not going to make any real progress in the larger war on terrorism. If the president can't "walk his own talk" and continues to accept the status quo in Pakistan, how can he expect General Musharraf to behave any differently? If Musharraf is willing to pack his nation's Supreme Court with stooges and amend its constitution so that he can never be held accountable for his actions, he might as well appoint himself president for life and be done with it.

It is long past time for an American president to realize that the only way to avoid experiencing déjà vu all over again with our foreign policy is to let consistency in our principles trump the convenience of our causes, when these two ideals are in conflict. Also, in order to change hearts and minds in the Muslim world, we need to practice a less duplicitous foreign policy with our key Islamic allies. Only by refocusing our foreign policy on core American values, can we expect to make progress in Pakistan and the Muslim world. In fact, only by returning to a foreign policy that is solidly based on our cherished principles, can we regain the respect of the larger fraternity of nations? With the Annapolis summit in mind, now might be a good time for President Bush to send such an unequivocal message to the Arab world.

Sunday, September 16, 2007

Don’t Misunderestimate the Strategery – It’s Stay the Course!

Our first MBA president has taken the Drucker principle of management by objectives and turned it on its head. President Bush has instead managed by strategy and manipulated the objectives to fit the strategy. This has clearly been the case with his Iraq policy, where the president has used a very nebulous and ill-defined strategy, which has been consistently referred to as “staying the course.” And yet, the objectives in Iraq have been frequently manipulated – from finding WMD, then establishing democracy, to defeating the insurgency, etc. – all to fit the same adamant “stay the course” strategy.

In the first year of the war, the objective was pretty much to find Iraq’s WMD and President Bush was determined to “stay the course” until they were found. Following David Kay’s shocking “I don’t think they existed” revelation in January 2004 about Iraq’s WMD, and the Iraq Survey Group’s subsequent confirmation of the same, President Bush changed his objective for Iraq. Following his own reelection, and with Iraqis then voting in their first elections, President Bush’s objective for Iraq became,
“a free, representative government that is an ally in the war on terror, and a beacon of hope in a part of the world that is desperate for reform.”
Alas, his strategy to get there remained essentially to “stay the course.”

Even more unfortunately, a month before President Bush stated this new lofty goal for Iraq, Vice President Cheney had already predicated “staying the course” by dismissing a growing insurgency as being “in its last throes.” In early 2006 a critical Shiite mosque in Samara was torched and much of central Iraq was overwhelmed by violence. So the Bush Administration changed its objective in Iraq yet again. The objective was no longer to build a liberal democracy but to focus on defeating a raging insurgency. Regrettably, the strategy to get there was essentially a “clear, hold, and build” version of “stay the course,” in the sense that it relied on Iraq’s notoriously unreliable security forces to do the “hold and build” part.

Meanwhile “staying the course” in Iraq for almost four years without tangible results did not go down well with the American public. So they expressed their displeasure in the 2006 mid-term elections by voting the president’s party out of power from both chambers in Congress. Shortly after, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) issued its recommendations and endorsed President Bush’s new post-election strategic goal for an Iraq that could
“govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.”
However, President Bush chose not to implement the ISG’s methodology of getting there. Instead in January 2007, President Bush finally announced a new “surge” strategy to be executed under the auspices of General Petraeus.

The new “surge” strategy relied on 30,000 more American troops to “clear, hold, and build” in and around Baghdad so as to bring down the violence and thus give Iraqis a chance at political reconciliation. Fortunately, even before the “surge” started, it benefited from unexpected success in the western Iraqi province of Anbar, where the local population turned against Al Qaeda insurgents. But sadly, the political apparatus in Baghdad far from reconciling began to fall apart as Sunni and Shia leaders began to desert the Al-Maliki government at regular intervals throughout the spring and summer.

By its very definition, a surge is a temporary phenomenon and hence the gains that come with it can also be transitory. The pockets of peace that have been established in the tribal areas of Iraq should thus be celebrated with caution. These nomadic desert tribes have had a history of transient and shifting loyalties. Nonetheless, to maintain these gains on the periphery, a strong central uniting force is absolutely critical. If an Iraqi Prime Minister is incapable of holding the center, a lasting peace will never come to Baghdad, and Iraq will eventually break apart.

Prior to the much anticipated Petraeus Report to Congress on September 10th, a couple of other independent sources, such as the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Jones Commission also released their findings on post-surge Iraq. The GAO found that
“Iraq has failed to meet 11 of the 18 military and political objectives, or benchmarks, set by Congress and agreed on by Mr. Bush,”
according to a New York Times report dated September 4th. A couple of days later, Retired Marine Gen. James Jones presented his commission’s conclusions to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Per a NPR report,
“while Gen. Jones noted that there have been what he called ‘tactical successes’ with the U.S. troop surge, he said that Iraq remains torn by sectarian strife.”

Then, on the sixth anniversary of 9/11, General Petraeus testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee with his take on the “surge.” This is how ABC News reported one telling exchange between Senator John Warner and General Petraeus:

“Are you able to say at this time if we continue what you’ve laid before the Congress here as a strategy do you feel that is making America safer?” Warner asked.

“Sir, I believe that this is indeed the best course of action to achieve our objectives in Iraq,” Petraeus said.

“Does that make America safer?” Warner asked again.

“Sir,” Petraeus said, “I don't know actually.”


For having put General Petraeus in a position where he had to give such an answer, President Bush ought to feel ashamed. President Bush could not very well have made such a candid assessment himself, so he chose to hide behind General Petraeus. It is an even bigger shame that President Bush is thus politicizing our military by using its officers to effectively prolong his failed Iraq policy.

Following the 2006 mid-term elections and the subsequent Iraq Study Group report, President Bush made a gullible American public believe that his “surge” strategy would be different and its primary purpose would be to meet political objectives in Iraq. The “surge” has more or less given us the same old, same old. Nonetheless, President Bush and his die-hard supporters are intent on moving “forward to the past,” which is basically the same as “staying the course.” While the rest of us want to go “back to the future,” in which we could finally “give peace a chance.”

In an ironic case of real life imitating art, it is as if President Bush has all along been pleading with us not to “misunderestimate the strategery.” But seriously, how long can he muddle along in Iraq without further weakening our overstretched Army and Marines? How many more times are we going to hear that “the next six months are critical?” With no exit strategy in sight, when President Bush finally leaves office in January 2009, he is on track to leave behind not only a stalemate in Iraq, but also a broken military – that would be some legacy, indeed!

Sunday, September 02, 2007

After Summer Surge, Comes Fall Purge?

Labor Day, which marks the official end of summer, is upon us. Let us hope that this year it marks an end to our discontent with the intense heat both, meteorologically and metaphorically. It was sad to see the President and Congress, who profess to “support our troops” at every opportunity they get, beat a hasty retreat from the hot August nights of Washington, D.C. Before they “got outta Dodge,” they could have at least afforded the same luxury to a few of our valiant troops, who continued to sizzle in the 130 degree heat of Baghdad.

In his July 20, 2007 column, the conservative chameleon Charles Krauthammer decided that after waiting 18 months “for the 80 percent solution,” he now feels comfortable switching sides to “the 20 percent solution.” This happens to be the same 20 percent of the population that ruled under Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – against whom President Bush launched this war, toppled its government, and then proceeded to quickly de-Baathify (akin to de-Sunnify) its new power structure.

Mr. Krauthammer speculated that
“Maliki & Co. are afraid we are arming Sunnis for the civil war to come. On the other hand, we might be creating a rough balance of forces that would act as a deterrent to all-out civil war and encourage a relatively peaceful accommodation. In either case, that will be Iraq’s problem after we leave.”

It is precisely this kind of arrogance and disdain that the Bush Administration has shown in its conduct of the Iraq war and its larger Middle East policy that aggravates and insults Muslim throughout the world. Mr. Krauthammer should have realized by now that his “purely American vision” is unlikely to solve the problem in Iraq and the larger Middle East.

So while he has been cooling off in Kennebunkport this August, President Bush hopefully reflected more deeply on the significance of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent visit with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran. The two beaming leaders clutched hands, just like President Bush and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia did in Crawford, Texas back in April 2005. This renewed embrace by the two Shiite leaders of Iran and Iraq was a direct consequence of the Petraeus plan that unfolded in the Anbar province of western Iraq over the summer. It is no coincidence that the Maliki government was simultaneously deserted by Sunni leaders in the Iraqi Parliament just as the larger Sunni population began making its peace with U.S. forces west of Baghdad.


The current Shiite government in Iraq, which the Bush Administration helped elect and install, must have had a sense of déjà vu with the resurgence of Sunni power that was being aided by freshly supplied U.S. arms. How long then, it must have wondered, before a Saddam wannabe threatens to topple a duly-elected Shiite government by force? How long before the whole world is back to square one in Iraq?

So both, Democrats and Republicans might just want to reconsider the notion that the main problem in Iraq lies with Mr. Maliki. In order to get the surge to work in Baghdad, General Petraeus struck a deal with Sunni insurgents in Iraq’s western Anbar province. This peace has come at a big price – it not only drove Shiite Prime Minister Maliki into the arms of his Iranian sponsor Ahmedinejad in Tehran, but also got him to embrace Syrian strongman Bashir in Damascus. Rearmed Sunnis must surely have rekindled flashbacks of the Saddam era in the Shia leader’s mind.

Nonetheless, Maliki might just be smarter than we imagine – he could already be making plans for an Iraq after the U.S. leaves. Prime Minister Maliki might just pull of an early “October surprise” for the United States a full year before our own presidential elections – by calling for a phased withdrawal of American troops before President Bush has even had time to digest the Petraeus report. I suspect that Bush’s recent indictment of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and his subsequent Vietnam analogy could have been directed more at Maliki than at the American public?

The Bush Administration has always insisted that “we fight them over there, so that we don't have to fight them over here.” General Petraeus, in lock step with this viewpoint, recently told Rep. Jan Schakowsky that U.S. forces could be in Iraq for the next nine to ten years. Well, pulling out of Iraq might just turn that argument on its head. All manner of pundits have been predicting an all-out civil war in Iraq if we prematurely withdraw. However, there is more likely to be prolonged internecine warfare in the larger Middle East amongst the various Muslim factions – Sunni, Shia, Kurds, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, etc – across multiple borders and involving at the very least Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and the Palestine territories.

While these angry followers of Islam are thus engaged in sorting out their problems, the rest of the western world could be at peace, albeit, an expensive one. We might be forced to pay ten dollars a gallon for gas while it lasts, but in the long run that could well be well worth the price for peace and security in the homeland. More importantly, our overall price tag could be far less than the $500 billion that we have already spent on the Iraq war. Also, at $10 per gallon of gas, I am confident that American ingenuity would quickly develop alternative fuel sources that could rid us of what President Bush referred to as our “addiction to oil.

Wednesday, August 22, 2007

The Pakistani Paradox

There was a disconcerting common thread in Moshin Hamid's rather reluctant celebration of Pakistan's 60th birthday on the editorial pages of the August 15th New York Times. It turns out that Pakistan has been “a steadfast American ally” whenever it happened to be under military rule as was true with Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan in the 1960s, Gen. Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s, and Gen. Pervez Musharraf in the 2000s. Ironically, General Musharraf was also quite the American media darling when he was peddling his book last year – even making a coveted appearance on Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show.” However, given all the recent negative press, it has become rather apparent that the General has long since fallen out of favor.

As the reluctant fundamentalist’s article implies, and those of us who grew up in the Indian subcontinent are keenly aware, military dictators have never ever been as good for Pakistan as they have been for the United States. In keeping with this tradition, General Musharraf has had his illicit turn but now his time is up. The purported power-sharing agreement that he has been trying to finalize with ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto would be bad for both Pakistan and the United States – ipso facto, the idea having emanated out of the Bush Administration, it would surely be unpalatable to the larger Pakistani population.

Since 9/11 General Musharraf has been consistently accused of having it both ways in trying to balance his covert support for the Taliban versus his overt allegiance to the Bush Administration in hunting down Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. One could infer that President Bush has also been trying to play it both ways with Pakistan, given his bold pronouncement following 9/11 to be resolute against “any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism.” Despite knowing for a long time now that “Taliban and Qaeda fighters continue to find shelter and support on Pakistan’s side of the Afghan border,” President Bush has not acted decisively against them. The New York Times reported recently that the Bush Administration scrubbed “a 2005 American attempt to capture Qaeda leaders on Pakistani soil.”

Pakistan is and has always been the “Rodney Dangerfield” of nations – unable to command any respect. In fact, General Musharraf's confession to 60 Minutes correspondent Steve Kroft during his book promotion interview last September confirms this viewpoint. Per the General’s own account, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage made a very blunt threat to Pakistan’s Director of Intelligence:
“Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age.”
Herein lies the Pakistani paradox, which appears to be a dilemma that actually confronts most Muslim nations – how to reconcile the requirements for a functioning liberal democracy against the seemingly conflicting demands of an orthodox Muslim theology? Democracy did not seem to be the perfect solution for India in 1947, but both democracy and a secular India have managed to survive and prosper through some tumultuous times. Pakistan could yet become a shining example of a Muslim democracy, provided its military stops stepping in every time it foresees or fakes a “crisis.” And, more importantly, the next time a military officer dares to overthrow an elected government in Pakistan, the United States should use whatever means necessary to force him back into his barracks.

Saturday, August 11, 2007

A ‘New Clear’ Passage to India

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 after China’s first nuclear test in 1964 and before India’s first nuclear explosion ten years later. At that time, the NPT recognized as “nuclear weapon states,” only those nations that had conducted nuclear tests prior to 1967. These nations happened to be the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Although the People’s Republic of China did not take its legitimate place as a UN member until 1971 and then signed the NPT only in 1992.

A recent New York Times editorial lamented that “When it comes to nuclear proliferation, Washington's only real policy is to reward its friends and punish its enemies.” Even if there were something wrong with this typically conservative principle, it should be noted that U.S. foreign policy had made some rather hefty concessions back in the early seventies to accommodate communist China. This was part of President Nixon’s “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” overture to engage one communist giant while trying to contain the other – the Soviet Union.

These progressive considerations of yesteryear have brought us to the current situation, in which China is now viewed by our foreign policy establishment as a long-term strategic threat to the United States. We find ourselves in this predicament, in large part, because our policy of engagement has helped steer China towards a market economy without bringing about commensurate change in its political system and authoritarian form of government.

The afore-mentioned Times editorial also stated that
“President Bush is understandably desperate for some kind of foreign policy success”
and thereby implying that his India strategy could actually chalk one up for him in the win column. It is quite likely that Bush’s forward-thinking nuclear deal with India might do just that. This is one instance where the neocons in the Bush Administration are actually seeing the forest for the trees by laying the foundation for a seminal paradigm shift in 21st century U.S. foreign policy – one that not only addresses our China syndrome, but also considers the larger threat as defined by the ongoing “global war on terror.”

So then why is Wall Street Journal columnist, Bret Stephens, not a happy camper? In a recent column he accused our “new clear” partner of keeping “bad company” with Iran. Mr. Stephens’ probably needs a refresher course on our own recent haphazard dealings with Iran. After 9/11, a “coalition -- made up of Iran, India, Russia and the Northern Alliance, and aided by massive American airpower -- drove the Taliban from power.” Despite this measure of Persian support, barely a couple of months later in his 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush went on to declare Iran as a charter member of his “axis of evil.” Then, to further confound matters, he placed an unseemly reliance on dubious information from known Iranian-sympathizer, Ahmed Chalabi, and invaded Iraq in March 2003.

If that weren’t bewildering enough, since 2005 President Bush has relied heavily on the Iranian-backed government of Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki to “sustain, govern and defend itself.” But now, with the weight of the impending Petraeus Report hanging over its head, the Bush Administration figures that Shiite Iran’s influence in the Middle East is getting out of control. So the Administration wants to hedge its bets on Iraq and re-supply our traditional Sunni allies, Saudi Arabia and its satellite Gulf States, over $20 billion in an arms deal. This is the same Saudi Arabia that – accounted for fifteen of nineteen hijackers on the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and – gave birth to Osama Bin Laden and the Bush Administration’s original “war on terror.” Is it any wonder then, why they – the Muslim nations – continue to hate us?

If Mr. Stephens could see the forest for the trees, he might have realized that going forward India could actually help us with our tenuous relationship with Iran. More importantly, these two nations could also help us snare our $50 million man, who has enjoyed a safe haven within the borders of another shaky Sunni ally, Pakistan, since his escape from the Tora Bora mountains in late 2001 . From a long term strategic standpoint, just as we look to India as a counter-weight to China in Asia, it is within our national security interests to have a Shia power counter-balance the traditional Sunni hegemony in the Middle East.

From a more practical standpoint, our “new clear” passage to India could mutually benefit not only our two great democracies, but also it could become the basis for new, long-term alliances throughout the western world. My reasoning is based on an observation that I had first made in my 2005 book, “The Bush Diaries,” and is worth repeating:

“The population of the world can be divided into roughly four equal quadrants — Judeo-Christian, Hindu-Buddhist, Muslim, and Communist. A vast majority of the people that constitute the Judeo-Christian and Hindu-Buddhist quadrants happen to live in secular democracies. It would therefore seem natural for these quadrants to be more closely aligned, since they share similar economic and political value systems? One would hope that an alignment of this nature could become an ideal for peace and prosperity throughout the world.”

Sunday, July 08, 2007

Gap could sue U.S. for infringement of "Banana Republic" brand

I don’t even need to go into the Bush Administration’s first term transgressions, about which I have published an entire book called “The Bush Diaries.” Here are five revelations, from just the past few months, as to why the Gap, Inc. could sue the United States for infringing on its “Banana Republic” brand:

1. Week of July 2, 2007 – from various news reports: While commuting I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby’s sentence on July 2nd President Bush said, “I respect the jury's verdict. But I have concluded that the prison sentence given to Mr. Libby is excessive.” However, the very next day, President Bush refused to rule out a full pardon for Libby saying, “As to the future, I rule nothing in and nothing out.” Meanwhile, in an American Research Group poll, 64% of Americans voiced their disapproval of President Bush’s decision.

2. Jun 29, 2007 report by the Associated Press: “An assistant attorney general at the Justice Department announced her resignation on Friday, becoming the seventh official to quit the department since the Democratic-led Congress launched an investigation in March into the firing of nine federal prosecutors.” This exodus comes on the heels of Attorney General Gonzales’ April 19 testimony to Congress during which he suffered a bout of amnesia uttering variations of “I do not recall” over 70 times.

3. June 24, 2007 report in the Washington Post: Barton Gellman and Jo Becker’s four-part series “The Angler” provided sufficient evidence of a loose chameleon running amok in the White House. The Post reporters claimed that Vice President Cheney’s general counsel had asserted that “the vice presidency is a unique office that is neither a part of the executive branch nor a part of the legislative branch.”

4. May 16, 2007 report in the Washington Post: In March 2004 White House Consiglierie Alberto “Fredo” Gonzales made a midnight run on the intensive care unit of George Washington University Hospital. Fredo and White House chief of staff Andrew Card raced to ailing Attorney General John Ashcroft’s bedside in the ICU to force him to reauthorize President Bush's warrantless wiretapping program of U.S. citizens.

5. April 30, 2006 report in the Boston Globe: “President Bush has quietly claimed the authority to disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office, asserting that he has the power to set aside any statute passed by Congress when it conflicts with his interpretation of the Constitution.”

This sorry record reminds me of a joke that I had heard on TV from the Democratic Party pundit, Paul Begala. In the heat of the post-2000 election fiasco, Mr. Begala had wise-cracked,
“We are not a banana republic. We only have banana Republicans.”
At that time, he had it only half-right. Given the way the Bush Administration has governed since, the Gap could easily win its brand infringement case in a court of law, albeit, in a foreign one! The U.S. courts would probably need to recuse themselves due to a conflict of interest!

Saturday, May 19, 2007

The 21st Century China Syndrome

Prior to 9/11 China was high on the Bush Administration’s priorities, but Iraq has pretty much consumed the Bush presidency since then. Here’s what BBC News reported on the eve of Secretary Powell’s first visit to Beijing in July 2001:
Almost immediately he arrived in the White House President Bush began talking tough on China. President Clinton liked to refer to China as a strategic ‘partner’. President Bush changed that to strategic ‘competitor’.

In the six years of the Bush presidency, the U.S. trade deficit with China has ballooned 180% from $83 billion in 2001 to $233 billion in 2006 per the Foreign Trade Statistics of the U.S. Census Bureau.

In January 2007, the Associated Press reported that
“China's foreign exchange reserves, already the world's largest, have passed US$1 trillion,”
and
“economists believe about 70 percent is in U.S. Treasuries.”

Given these statistics it would seem on the surface that the Bush Administration has only managed to further solidify China’s role as a “strategic partner” to the United States. In fact, with the U.S. economy now so heavily dependent on China, President Bush – in the little time that he has left in his term – and future U.S. presidents are going to find it increasingly difficult to change the status quo with China without a paradigm shift in our China policy.

So I was not at all surprised when George Will expressed his very own skepticism in a recent column, “Real Change In China?” using James Mann’s book, “The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression,” as a reference. However, it is important for Americans to realize that Mr. Will's “regime change” sought by President Nixon’s policy of engagement with China has still to bear fruit after 35 years. By comparison our policy of containment of the Soviet Union and communism, initiated by President Truman after World War II, achieved its objective in 45 years.

Coincidentally, containment was also beginning to languish as an ineffective doctrine around its 35th anniversary until President Reagan took office in 1981. He then jump-started it with his “evil empire” offensive and the Soviet Union collapsed barely a decade later.

As mentioned earlier, President Bush has been overwhelmed by the “global war on terror” that he initiated under the auspices of his very own “Bush Doctrine.” Unfortunately, the magnitude and complexity of conducting this preemption policy has rendered him incapable of seriously revisiting our China engagement policy – which happens to be languishing, like its Soviet containment cousin did, in its 35th anniversary.

Meanwhile, as the U.S. economy continues to get more and more interminably entwined and dependent on China, cold turkey disengagement is hardly a viable option and “real change in China” slips further into oblivion. No matter how China performs in the 2008 Beijing Olympics, it long ago won the gold medal for international statecraft.

Alas, we have already begun to witness the 21st century China Syndrome – in which China has already demonstrated its ability to launch a missile and destroy an orbiting satellite, to make and launch a satellite for Nigeria, and has also publicly announced its intention to land on the moon by 2010.

Thus, the strategic imperative for the United States is no longer in doubt – China has already morphed into a “worrisome competitor” – we must therefore redefine and pursue a more holistic relationship with this budding superpower, one that encompasses economic, foreign, and trade policies that are not only in sync with our core values, but also more cognizant of the 21st century China Syndrome.

Monday, April 30, 2007

Mayday Mission Deconstructed – GWOT morphs into the “GWOB”


In a bitter irony, the Democratic Congress will present President Bush a new war funding bill – which he has promised to veto – on the fourth anniversary of his infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech of May 1, 2003. Meanwhile the American public is screaming, “Mayday! Mayday! Mayday!” because President Bush is surging troops four years after he had declared “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.”

After tolerating four years of incompetence, the American people had clearly expressed their desire in the 2006 mid-term elections – to change the status quo ante in Iraq. Nevertheless, President Bush persists with a military “surge” strategy that defies the will of a majority of the people. Tragically, the Associated Press reported today that “U.S. Military Deaths Toll Rises Above 100 for Month, Making April Deadliest of 2007 So Far” and it also confirmed that April “has been the deadliest month for British forces in Iraq since the first month of the war.” In a weird twist of fate, the United States has gone from being a purveyor of “shock and awe” to becoming its hapless witness – as is evidenced in the ever-increasing carnage wrought by Iraq’s warring sectarian factions.

It thus seemed even more ironical that on the same day that we learned about the death of former Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, we also read about the American military building the equivalent of the “Great Wall of Baghdad (GWOB).” One might recall the big bear from Moscow climbing atop a tank to defend Russia’s fledgling democracy in 1991– an action that came to symbolize the tipping point in the dismantling of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Exactly twenty months and ten days after the Berlin Wall fell, the great wall of totalitarianism surrounding the “evil empire” had also been irrevocably ruptured.

Given the significance of walls in political history, it was rather distressing to find out that the world’s greatest democracy had sanctioned the erection of the GWOB in the darkest traditions of Berlin and Belfast. Could the U.S. have emulated a worse symbol of authoritarian occupation in Iraq than through a Soviet-style balkanization of the Iraqi people? The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has just morphed into what could become its defining symbol – the GWOB. So much for bringing freedom and democracy to the Middle East – yet another of the Bush Administration’s ever-changing Iraq objectives has been turned on its head.

Finally, with their reported attempts to appoint a war czar at home, it is apparent that the Bush Administration is no longer in a state of denial – they are clearly trying to finesse a war situation that is going from bad to worse. President Bush has surely seen the writing on the wall – but it is not the graffiti on the GWOB going up in Iraq. No, I suspect that he has finally foreseen the fate of his GWOT policy of preemption, a.k.a. the Bush Doctrine. No one should be surprised if there is a “Roving” hand behind this final preemptive strike – to appoint a fall guy to manage the chaos as “the gang that couldn’t shoot straight” heads for the exit on the greatest disaster in American foreign policy in history.

Saturday, April 21, 2007

Foreign Policy Evolution – My Way to the High Way

The recent kidnapping and release of British sailors by Iran should provide much needed foreign policy therapy to the western world. If the west is ever going to win the “global war on terror,” without preemptively calling it off, it needs to exhibit more backbone. It’s no surprise that these British sailors have been chastised for having “sung like canaries” after barely two weeks in captivity.

Instead of hearing “name, rank, and serial number,” the world saw these sailors acting chummy with their captors, “confessing” to their guilt, wearing enemy-supplied business suits, and pumping the Iranian president’s hand in deference. We have had real American civilian hostages, held for years in the eighties by Iranian-backed groups in Lebanon, who behaved with more dignity than these British “hostages.”

More importantly, their behavior is in stark contrast to the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, who have been held for over five years and subjected to some unquestionably rough treatment, but have yet to cough up the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden or Ayman Al Zawahiri. So it has become quite apparent that the western world needs to shift gears in its fight in the war on terror – it needs to reacquire its “Cold War-style” mentality and rely on more human intelligence than raw firepower to win it. (This is the basis for a “Silent War” strategy – that I had advocated back in September 2002 – which is explained in my 2005 book, “The Bush Diaries.”)

In the interim, by its very definition, the conduct of the “global war on terror” needs to be subject to international scrutiny. While speaking before a House appropriations subcommittee about Guantanamo Bay prisoners recently, Defense Secretary Gates requested Congress “to address the concerns about some of these people who really need to be incarcerated forever, but that doesn’t get them involved in a judicial system where there is the potential of them being released, frankly.”

Secretary Gates’ statement was troubling in many ways:

1. It implied continued distrust in the U.S. judicial system, which the Bush Administration has repeatedly tried to circumvent in the handling of suspects related to the attacks of 9/11.
2. By suggesting that some of these people “need to be incarcerated forever,” Mr. Gates was prejudging the gravity of their guilt, which thus far has not been proven in a court of law.
3. Whatever happened to the basic tenet – innocent until proven guilty – of modern western law?
4. Asking Congress to legislate the equivalent of what former Judge John J. Gibbons has referred to as “law-free zones” within the United States sets a dangerous precedent – imagine American citizens being held in foreign countries that established their own “law-free zones?”

As horrific as the events of 9/11 were, the United States has since been viewed internationally as subverting the rule of law at Guantanamo Bay – akin to changing the rules in the middle of the ball game to ensure that it wins. If President Bush is serious about bringing democracy to the Middle East, he must realize that it is not a zero sum game – it does not have to be restricted at home to export it abroad. In clichéd terms – democracy, like happiness, is not a destination but a journey. How one gets there is as important as actually getting there? Noble ends do not justify ignoble means – habeas corpus rights ought to be universal and sacrosanct. Winning over the hearts and minds of those Middle East monarchies has become harder with the Bush Administration’s “do as I say, not as I do” approach to fundamental human rights.

Speaking of monarchies, Jim Hoagland wrote about “Bush’s Royal Trouble” recently in his Washington Post column and why King Abdullah had turned down one of those rare Bush White House state dinner invitations. In my judgment, this trouble is not as much of an indicator that “Saudis, too, know how to read election returns” in the United States, as it is their recognition of the new realpolitik in the Middle East. Apparently, Jordan's King Abdullah has also told the White House – guess who else is not coming to dinner? It is therefore pretty obvious that major foreign policy realignment is in the works amongst the Sunni nations of the Middle East.

It’s clear that the Sunni command structure has been threatened by the outcome of the Iraq war. In essence, they have seen an oil-rich, Sunni-ruled nation fall under the influence of Iran – a rising symbol of Shia power, which supports the likes of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. But they have also seen the growth of this Shia power emanating from their people via popular elections, whereas Sunni supremacy continues to be sustained through unpopular monarchies. The Sunni royals recognize that going forward Islam could be their great uniter, if not their savior – and thus, they must try to co-opt Iran before the West does.

However, co-opting Iran is anathema to the Bush Administration – they won’t even talk to Iran or, for that matter, Syria. Given the Sunni realignment taking place in the Middle East, one would imagine that the Bush Administration would engage these two neighbors of Iraq to ensure that its Iraq policy does not get burned at both – Sunni and Shia – ends of the stick. But then, charity begins at home – if the Bush Administration has a basic problem uniting domestic opposition to its war policies, how is it going to bring foreign opponents to the Iraq table?

This “my way or the highway” culture is inbred – most domestic opponents of President Bush’s “global war on terror” policies are constantly harangued by all manner of conservatives as being unpatriotic. It stems from their extension of Bush’s “you’re either with us or against us” philosophy to ordinary American citizens who have a different viewpoint. Again, had the Iraq war – a war of choice – not been a “sacrifice-free” war for most Americans, they would have found it harder to polarize the populace so effectively. Also, if President Bush has been unable to convince a majority of Americans as to the reasons for continuing with the Iraq war, now in its fifth year, he is going to find it increasingly difficult to win there. It can therefore be argued that it is the president who is being unpatriotic by deliberately persisting with a policy that most Americans believe is causing long term damage to the foreign policy and overall reputation of the United States?

Is it any wonder then that we had neoconservative David Brooks lamenting in his recent New York Times column that “a new Republican governing philosophy did not emerge” prior to the last election? Mr. Brooks even suggested that the GOP needed to “shift mentalities.” If this is any indication that the neoconservative movement has finally started to unravel, there still maybe hope going forward. It should clearly begin with a new direction in U.S. foreign policy – one that will take the high road to restore the principles, respect, and leadership of the United States, and one that let all the neocons bail out at the last exit entitled, “My Way.”

Tuesday, March 27, 2007

Blog Hits 4 Bush

The Supreme Court recently heard a case relating to the First Amendment rights of an Alaskan high school kid. This smart aleck was chastised by his school principal because he held up a sign – outside school property and hence its jurisdiction – that read “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”

There were two things that struck me about this case. My initial reaction was – wow! Doesn’t the Supreme Court have enough of a case load without wanting to waste its time on an appeal as seemingly “dopey” as this? But in a more serious vein, I wondered – will this august body ever review more significant First Amendment violations, inherent in Sections 215 and 505 of the Patriot Act, that were imposed upon the larger American public by President Bush?

Fortunately, in this age of interactive digital communications, redress is a click away and in a medium where substance often trumps style. The classical sound bite that used to be proffered by a select few is being superseded by a plethora of instantaneous “vivoda” bytes. This multiplex of video, voice, and data opinions is being constantly disseminated by the people, for the people, and to the people. Welcome to the blogosphere – a fundamental instrument of 21st century democracy!

One would have thought that the Bush Administration would have learned by now that responsibility is when you acknowledge your mistake; accountability is when you pay for it. Oftentimes one can pay for a mistake through a sincere apology, but sometimes the gravity of the blunder is such that it necessitates the perpetrator’s resignation or dismissal from said position of responsibility. Each of the recent major gaffes committed by various Bush Administration officials require a resolution that satisfies the public trust.

In “Walter Gate” the Bush Administration was clearly worried of losing a core Republican constituency – the U.S. military and their families – had the scandal not been quickly contained. As a result, Army Secretary Francis Harvey resigned, Army Surgeon General Kevin Kiley retired, and Walter Reed commander George Weightman was fired. They were all forced to take one for Team Bush so that the Administration could actually be seen as “walking its signature ‘support the troops’ talk.”

In “Libby Date” Vice President Cheney’s former chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, found it difficult to keep track of dates – and, when he had told or heard, what from or to whom – regarding the outing of CIA operative, Valerie Plame. A jury found him guilty of perjury and obstruction of justice and he now faces a June sentencing date with the judge. Per blogger speculation, Libby could get anywhere from 15 months to three years in jail. My own take on an intensely debated presidential pardon for Libby appeared in a letter to the New York Times on March 8, 2007.

In the “Attorneys Fate” fiasco, the blogosphere has more or less concurred with the mainstream media that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales will sooner than later meet the same fate as his “non-performing” U.S. Attorneys.

In the “Gay Hate” rant, General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shouldn’t be asked, but told by President Bush to issue an earnest apology for his abhorrent views. An initial surge of mainstream media opinions did make this demand, but corresponding blog hits did not keep up the pace. Nonetheless, the general needs to come out and apologize to all gays in general, but especially to those serving in uniform – and particularly to those risking their lives right now in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Finally, in the “FBI Bait” case, wherein hundreds of unauthorized national security letters (NSL) were issued to unsuspecting American citizens, President Bush needs to lift the gag order. This will allow bloggers an opportunity to legally do what the Washington Post afforded to an NSL recipient under cover of anonymity – an ability to exercise their First Amendment rights as guaranteed in the Constitution, so that they can continue to defend this self same Constitution from such egregious abuse in the future.

Since the WSJ editorial page actually ran a literal clarification for “Bong Hits 4 Jesus – Explained” – I thought it my help to know that the “hits” in my title don’t have anything to do with web statistics. They are simply good old fashioned hits – that represent feedback from the people to the president of the United States – and I can only hope that POTUS is listening!

Friday, March 23, 2007

The Political Pendulum: Swinging to Liberalism

There appears to be a karmic cycle in U.S. political ideology based on the political history of what is known as the "American century." A cursory analysis shows that U.S. political philosophy has followed a simple undulating pattern since the early 20th century.

The 1930s were a transitional decade from the roaring twenties – with the laissez-faire business policies pursued by Republican presidents, Harding and Coolidge – to the New Deal programs that were ushered in by Democratic president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), during the Great Depression.

The 1940s through 1960s defined the Liberal Era, which commenced under FDR – who went on to become the "demigod" of the Democratic Party. This progressive age witnessed unprecedented domestic reforms beginning with the landmark 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education outlawing segregation in public education, to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This golden age of liberalism also saw U.S. foreign policy in ascendant starting with the victory of our greatest generation in World War II, to the containment of communism during a prolonged Cold War, and culminating with a triumph in space over the Soviet Union by that visionary "leap for mankind" pre-ordained in the days of Camelot by President John F. Kennedy. Nonetheless, this exigent age also included an "Ozzie and Harriet" decade in the 1950s under the era's only Republican Administration led by President Eisenhower.

The 1970s became the next transitional decade from the swinging sixties – with the Great Society programs pursued by Democratic president, Lyndon Baines Johnson – to the initial chaos of Watergate and Vietnam under Republican presidents, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford; and to the latter turmoil of stagflation and the Iranian hostage crisis under Democratic president, Jimmy Carter.

The 1980s through 2000s define the Conservative Era, which began under President Reagan – who is now revered as the "icon" of the Republican Party. This restoration age gave birth to supply-side economics, has produced over 45 million jobs to-date while simultaneously taming inflation, and has seen a critical tilt in the U.S. Supreme Court toward starboard. This heyday of conservatism has also seen U.S. foreign policy reach an early crescendo with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the "evil empire" to end the Cold War. However, following the attacks of 9/11, we have seen the advent of the Bush Doctrine and a new long "war on terror." Nonetheless, this challenging age also had an intervening decade of "peace and prosperity" in the 1990s under the era's only Democratic Administration led by President Clinton.

Based on this karmic cycle, one can expect to live through another transitional decade in the 2010s as the U.S. adjusts to the dawn of a new liberal era. However, as President Nixon did in 1969 with an unpopular war in Vietnam, the new president in 2009 will face a similar testing time trying to end America's involvement in another unpopular war in Iraq.

One can only hope that U.S. political history will be as instructive to the new president in 2009 as U.S. political karma should be to all of us? For the great American philosopher, George Santayana, had wisely intoned at the start of the great American century,
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

Monday, March 19, 2007

The Only Way Out of Iraq

On the eve of the fourth anniversary of the Iraq war, the Washington Post editors did an insightful take on the “Lessons of War.” This editorial was all the more conspicuous by the absence of the word “Islam” in any form throughout their analysis. This is a vital lesson that the Bush Administration and its neocon advisors have refused to learn during the four year occupation of Iraq. While the Administration might insist on Iraq being the “central front in the war on terror,” it really does not need to associate any of its brutal aspects with Islam. After all there are approximately 1.3 billion Muslims in the world, including about 5 million in the United States.

Having said that, any resolution to our involvement in Iraq will come from an answer to this key question that must be determined by polling the Iraqi people:
Are you Iraqi first and Muslim second, or are you Muslim first and Iraqi second?

If a majority of the Iraqis consider themselves Iraqi first, only then is it likely that President Bush’s current surge strategy will succeed. If a majority of the Iraqis consider themselves Muslim first, it is highly unlikely that any military solution – including the current surge strategy – is going to achieve the desired results. And, if this is indeed the case, the Bush Administration definitely needs to keep Islam out of the equation and pursue a purely political solution for Iraq.

The natural follow-up question to the “Muslim first” Iraqis would be:
Are you a Muslim first and Shia/Sunni second, or are you Shia/Sunni first and Muslim second?
However, this question seems redundant given that Iraqis have been involved, for over a year now, in a sectarian conflict – which is also a confirmation that they have pretty much put religion before country as well.

So if they are Shia/Sunni first, Muslim second and only then Iraqi, it would seem to me that we are inevitably headed for a modified but non-planned version of the Biden-Gelb plan – a violent trifurcation of Iraq without any central control.

Even if we did manage to bring a temporary peace to Baghdad and trained the Iraqi army for what it's worth, can we really teach the Iraqi people patriotism and love of country over religion, when they have clearly shown a preference for their different strains of Islam? This is the real lesson to be learned from not only the Iraq War, but also the larger war on terror – we have to get religion out of the equation because nobody is going to concede that they are the children of a lesser god. Hasn’t history repeatedly taught us that indelible lesson?

I would hope it has. The only way left to get religion out of the equation, even at this late stage, is by co-opting friendly Muslim nations with sizeable armies to join U.S. forces in bringing peace to Iraq. This strategy might seem like naïveté, but we do provide large economic and military assistance to allies like Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey. It is time President Bush leaned on them to provide military personnel to help us complete our mission in Iraq. It’s only after friendly Muslim armies join us in Iraq that the local population will quickly assert the primacy of its Iraqi character – thereby ensuring our mission in Iraq will succeed. As we start our fifth year of occupation, this now appears to be the only way out of Iraq!

Tuesday, March 06, 2007

Gore's Karmic Cycle

Democrats are not going to like this comparison but there seems to be an uncanny parallel thus far between the political careers of Richard M. Nixon and Albert A. Gore, Jr.

Nixon served as a reserve officer in the US Navy during World War II, as a Congressman in the US House of Representatives (1947-1950), as a US Senator (1951-52), and as Vice President of the United States (1952-1960).

Gore served as a journalist in the US Army during the Vietnam War, as a Congressman in the US House of Representatives (1977-1984), as a US Senator (1985-92), and as Vice President of the United States (1993-2000).

In 1960 Nixon narrowly lost the presidency to Kennedy by a 0.2% margin in the popular vote and there were allegations of voter fraud in Illinois where a few thousand votes separated the two candidates.

In 2000 Gore lost the presidency to Bush despite winning the popular vote by a 0.5% margin and there were allegations of voter fraud in Florida where a few hundred votes separated the two candidates.

Two years after losing the presidency, Nixon made his famous declaration, "You won't have Nixon to kick around anymore, because, gentlemen, this is my last press conference" while acknowledging defeat in the 1962 California governor's race.

Two years after losing the presidency, Gore revealed his position regarding a 2004 rerun, "I've decided that I will not be a candidate," in an interview on the CBS News program "60 Minutes." This announcement came the day after Gore became the first former Vice President to host NBC's "Saturday Night Live."

In the six years that followed Nixon's "last press conference", the United States got involved in Vietnam in what began as a noble attempt at preventing Southeast Asia from succumbing to communist influence (under the auspices of the Communist Domino theory). By 1968, popular opinion had turned against the Vietnam War.

In the four years to-date after Gore's "SNL" and "60 Minutes" appearances, the United States got involved in Iraq in what began as a convoluted attempt at linking Saddam Hussein to 9/11, to stockpiles of WMD, and to the broader war on terror (under the auspices of the Bush Doctrine). By 2007, popular opinion had turned against the Iraq War.

Nearly eight years after losing his first run for president, Richard Nixon won the Republican Party's nomination once again in 1968 by defeating challenges from Nelson Rockefeller, Ronald Reagan, and George Romney. Nixon appealed to his conservative base by promising that "new leadership will end the war and win the peace in the Pacific." On November 5, 1968 Nixon, in his second attempt, was successfully elected 37th president of the United States.

My comparison stops at this point, but with Gore's recent resurgence with the American public and in the media, speculation is ripe that he will emulate his karmic equivalent and enter the 2008 race for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Given his winning positions on contemporary issues of the day ranging from the environment to the country's broader foreign policy problems, it shouldn't be hard for Gore to neutralize Senator Clinton's current front runner status in the Democratic slate of presidential candidates. Gore could do this more effectively by co-opting Senator Obama early on to provide Democrats with the winning ticket in 2008. It could very well launch the start of "GoreObamania" and hopefully close the loop on Gore's karmic cycle on November 4, 2008.

Tuesday, February 27, 2007

Paradigm Shift in U.S. Foreign Policy

A little over a year before the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly voted in his favor as President-elect, George W. Bush had been unable to name the foreign leaders of either the world's largest democracy, India, or its neighbor, Pakistan – which was soon to become a critical "ally" in the ensuing global war on terror.

An on-the-job training exercise that began with a botched air skirmish with China in the spring of 2001 continues to this day. The world has witnessed a series of bungled Bush foreign policy efforts that now include Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan and even Russia.

Senator Clinton launched her 2008 presidential campaign with a catchy phrase, when she declared, "…I'm in it to win it." President Bush and Prime Minister Blair would each have the world believe that this same phrase applies to their adamant positions on Iraq. It boggles one’s mind, nonetheless, that their recent contradictory moves on troop strength – Bush is surging while Blair is purging – have to be accepted by a more rational American public as, in Vice President Cheney’s own words, "…things are going pretty well."

When was the last time that the U.S. was so bitterly divided over a war? It was during the Vietnam War, when a majority of the American people believed that they had been lied to or deceived. In a karmic sense of déjà vu, the American public is once again witnessing the inability of a U.S. Administration – driven more by ego and less by principle – to accept reality. It is also quite obvious that the Bush Administration will continue to be, with apologies to Senator Clinton, “in it to spin it" until the political process forces a necessary change in leadership.

In an ironic reversal of roles, art has been imitating life in these United States where Hollywood has been taking its cue from Washington. Viewers of the popular TV series "24" cannot help but notice that this fictional show has more or less been following the script of the real life Bush Administration in these past couple of seasons. In both instances, members of the Administration seem to "love" their country more than its constitution – if that is even possible – and seem to be deluded into believing that their “unconditional love” puts them above the law?

Unfortunately, in the real world, the U.S. has been left with little control over its foreign policy. The primary lesson coming off the Bush Doctrine is that the U.S. must never use preemptive military power, unless it is certain that it will help attain attendant political objectives. The adjunct message is that if the military objective has been achieved, but the corresponding political objectives do not follow, the application of more military power is unlikely to yield the desired results.

So where does this leave the Foreign Policy of the United States (FPOTUS)? It might help if President Bush were to revisit recent FPOTUS history. Years before President Reagan initiated his long term FPOTUS strategy to win the Cold War; President Nixon had done the spade work by introducing a paradigm shift in the FPOTUS by opening a critical door – to China! This dramatic change was based on a simple principle – the enemy (China) of my enemy (Soviet Union) is my friend – that helped bring the Cold War closer to the "evil empire's" home and initiate its eventual collapse.

After 9/11 the United States government was accused of being unable to think outside the box. The FPOTUS under the Bush Administration has been stuck inside a “neocon” box, which has released “Pandoras” that they have been unable to control. In attempting to resolve the current mess in the Middle East, President Bush might want to opt for a paradigm shift in the FPOTUS. The enemy (Shia Iran) of my enemy (Sunni Al Qaeda) could radically alter the dynamics of the global war on terror and help return control of the FPOTUS to a weakened presidency.

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Why are we so awful at foreign policy?

In his New York Times column, “Stumbling Around the World”, Nicholas Kristof begs an answer to the question: Why are we so awful at foreign policy? Before I attempt to answer this question, I would like to cite two examples provided by Mr. Kristof:

Iraq is the example of the moment. We invaded, thinking that we would get a pro-American bulwark, cheap oil, long-term military bases and the gratitude of liberated Iraqis. Instead, we fought Iraq, and Iran won.

Speaking of which, look at Iran. In 1953, we helped overthrow the democratically elected prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, to achieve a more pro-Western government. That created tensions that led to the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the rise of mullahs with nuclear dreams. If it weren’t for our own policies, Iran might well now have a pro-American government.

Not surprisingly, since World War II, a linkage can be established between America’s preemptive wars/wars of choice and their desired outcomes: they have invariably failed and set back U.S. foreign policy for decades. In fact, if the target country had just two of its three defining national characteristics – language, religion, and form of government – differ widely from that of the western world, then invariably U.S. political objectives in a lengthy preemptive war (i.e. a war of choice) were never met.

In fact, even the short, CIA-supported, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba failed to overthrow Fidel Castro and helped further solidify Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union. Forty five years later Castro is still around and Cuba remains standing as one of the last vestiges of the communist dominoes.

Over fifty years after the Korean Armistice and thirty odd years after our ignominious withdrawal from SaigonNorth Korea and Vietnam remain as the other glaring examples of communist dominoes that our failed foreign policy ventures have left standing.

President Bush is now trying hard to prevent yet another U.S. foreign policy domino theory – the Bush Doctrine, which calls for pre-emptive action against states that pursue WMD programs and/or support terrorism in the name of religion – from failing in Iraq and spreading undesirable outcomes throughout the Middle East. If we fail in Iraq, the Bush Administration is concerned that Iran and Syria will be the next dominoes to fall – in that, they will acquire WMD and more overtly support terrorist acts against western interests around the world.

My answer to Mr. Kristof’s question can be found in a letter of mine that was published in The Wall Street Journal on October 6, 2006:
We continue to talk about the "root cause of terrorism," but there seems to be a basic disconnect between the Judeo-Christian and Muslim worlds' reasoning on this issue. Muslim dictators use their convenient line that "Palestine is the core issue," while Western leaders seem to have coalesced on "freedom and democracy" as being their core issue in the post-9/11 era.
The U.S. could make serious progress with this reasoning if it showed some consistency in the application of its core values to its foreign policy. This would necessarily imply that we make no exceptions of convenience even in the short-term: Musharraf, Mubarak, Nazarbayev, Abdallah, et al. We insult the intelligence of the common Muslim populace with these exceptions of convenience -- this is the core issue, it seems to me.
The bottom line is that we are so awful at foreign policy because it is not consistent, it does not reflect our core values, and we make too many exceptions of convenience.

Friday, January 12, 2007

The Clock Is Ticking On Iraq

Pundits have compared President Bush's escalation of the Iraq war to President Nixon's April 1970 decision to invade Cambodia as a means to a successful withdrawal from Vietnam. Five years later we were fleeing from the rooftop of the US embassy in Saigon – a lesson that our current president seems to have forgotten.

The key difference between Vietnam and Iraq is quite stark. An ethnically homogeneous Vietnam had been split into a communist North and democratic South as a reflection of larger Cold War rivalries. After the fall of Saigon, the reintegration of Vietnam was traumatic but successful. By contrast, Iraq as a nation was created by the British from three ethnically diverse regions – a largely Shia south, a primarily Kurdish north, and a mostly Sunni west – that have historically been at odds. Any wonder then that a Baathist dictator – not surprisingly, secular in his outlook – held the country together for almost three decades by brute force?

The sectarian strife in Iraq reached a tipping point almost a year ago, when Shiite Islam's holiest shrine in Samarra was destroyed by Sunni insurgents. Then the recent retaliatory and ham-handed execution of Saddam Hussein by a vengeful Shiite government more or less ensured that Iraqis had reached a point of no return in their attempts at keeping a united Iraq. So it has become almost impossible now for any western nation to try and secure Iraq in the short term.

NBC's Tim Russert was absolutely right when he called President Bush's proposal a "double or nothing" gambit, which is sure to, as the New York Times put it, "run out the clock and leave his mess for the next one." Unfortunately, the real disaster would be inherited by the next president who, in attempting to sort out President Bush's mess, will likely be doomed to one term. It therefore makes sense for Democrats and Republicans alike to coalesce around the May 2006 Biden-Gelb plan and ensure its success by involving all of Iraq's six neighbors in immediate discussions to fine tune and implement it. We need to act post-haste before the clock runs out on the only workable option for Iraq – a return to pre-British historical boundaries that had evolved naturally and co-existed in the pre-colonial era.

Saturday, January 06, 2007

A True Council for Real Security

For "Saturday Night Live" fans, it shouldn't be hard to recall an emotion made famous by comedian Mike Myers in the late eighties. So readers will understand when I suggest that an ineffective UN Security Council has been making me "vaklempt" for quite some time now. With apologies to Mr. Myers, I'd actually express my feelings this way:
"Hi, this is Linda Richman. I'm vaklempt! Excuse me… talk amongst yourselves! Here, let me give you a topic: The Security Council is neither making the world really secure these days, nor is it a truly representative council of today's world. Discuss."

On December 23rd a tepid Security Council unanimously passed a watered-down sanctions resolution against Iran. Do these resolutions mean anything anymore – unless they are required as some sort of justification prior to military action against a condemned country? And, what's with this need for unanimity – which is invariably inversely proportional to the efficacy of the resolution being passed. Besides, unanimity in democratic forums is almost oxymoronic. In any case, Russia and China got western nations to so dilute the sanctions against Iran that they might as well have not passed any resolution – because it resolves nothing, nada, zip, zero…

In 2006 alone, the Security Council has passed eight different resolutions on the "Situation in the Middle East" – has this made the Middle East even appear any more secure than it was last year? The Security Council also seems to have passed a resolution for every country on the African continent in 2006 – but do we see any improvements in Darfur or Somalia? What is the point in a world body that seems to spend countless hours talking up a storm, but ends up effectively doing nothing?

President Bush appointed John Bolton as our Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations with the hope that Ambassador Bolton would shake things up from its foundation as opposed to its top ten stories that he had once joked were irrelevant. But alas, the UN bureaucracy is too deep-rooted for even a straight-talking US Ambassador to loosen up in a couple of years. We need to approach this step-by-step and my first step would be to abolish the UN General Assembly. But knowing that this body of perpetually dissatisfied and largely third world dilettantes is going nowhere real fast, I would rather tackle reforming the UN Security Council on a priority basis.

It should be apparent to any rational person that the five veto-wielding members of the Security Council represent a world that existed in 1945. In the six decades since, the economic and geo-political realities of the world have substantially changed, but these have not been reflected in the make up of the Security Council. The first thing we all need to agree upon is that the veto-wielding membership needs to be raised from five to eight. The second thing that we can all easily agree upon is that France no longer deserves to be a veto-wielding member. Au Revoir, Mon Ami. No hard feelings, but Germany is now certainly more representative of the European Union than vous.

So the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Russia, and China will become the five veto-wielding members of the new Security Council. With Asia and the Far East making up nearly half of the world's population, it's a no-brainer that they should get at least four of the eight veto-wielding seats in the new Security Council. If Russia and China take up two of these four Asia/Far East slots, it's apparent that India (with its one-sixth of humanity and an exploding economy) and Japan (the world's second largest economy) qualify for the other two Asia/Far East positions. Finally, it is rather obvious that Brazil should get to represent South America as a veto-wielding member of the new Security Council.

After this new Security Council has been in place for a decade, we might want to consider raising the veto-wielding membership to ten by adding a member each from Africa and Eastern Europe. However, for now, it would make sense for the incoming UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, to take the necessary steps to immediately increase the veto-wielding membership of the UN Security Council to eight nations as follows: United States of America, United Kingdom, Russia, China, Germany, India, Japan, and Brazil.

With this new Security Council in place in early 2007, we can look forward to seating a body that is truly representative of the world and thus making hopes for a real peace all the more plausible.