Don’t Misunderestimate the Strategery – It’s Stay the Course!

Our first MBA president has taken the Drucker principle of management by objectives and turned it on its head. President Bush has instead managed by strategy and manipulated the objectives to fit the strategy. This has clearly been the case with his Iraq policy, where the president has used a very nebulous and ill-defined strategy, which has been consistently referred to as “staying the course.” And yet, the objectives in Iraq have been frequently manipulated – from finding WMD, then establishing democracy, to defeating the insurgency, etc. – all to fit the same adamant “stay the course” strategy.

In the first year of the war, the objective was pretty much to find Iraq’s WMD and President Bush was determined to “stay the course” until they were found. Following David Kay’s shocking “I don’t think they existed” revelation in January 2004 about Iraq’s WMD, and the Iraq Survey Group’s subsequent confirmation of the same, President Bush changed his objective for Iraq. Following his own reelection, and with Iraqis then voting in their first elections, President Bush’s objective for Iraq became,

“a free, representative government that is an ally in the war on terror, and a beacon of hope in a part of the world that is desperate for reform.”

Alas, his strategy to get there remained essentially to “stay the course.”

Even more unfortunately, a month before President Bush stated this new lofty goal for Iraq, Vice President Cheney had already predicated “staying the course” by dismissing a growing insurgency as being “in its last throes.” In early 2006 a critical Shiite mosque in Samara was torched and much of central Iraq was overwhelmed by violence. So the Bush Administration changed its objective in Iraq yet again. The objective was no longer to build a liberal democracy but to focus on defeating a raging insurgency. Regrettably, the strategy to get there was essentially a “clear, hold, and build” version of “stay the course,” in the sense that it relied on Iraq’s notoriously unreliable security forces to do the “hold and build” part.

Meanwhile “staying the course” in Iraq for almost four years without tangible results did not go down well with the American public. So they expressed their displeasure in the 2006 mid-term elections by voting the president’s party out of power from both chambers in Congress. Shortly after, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) issued its recommendations and endorsed President Bush’s new post-election strategic goal for an Iraq that could

“govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.”

However, President Bush chose not to implement the ISG’s methodology of getting there. Instead in January 2007, President Bush finally announced a new “surge” strategy to be executed under the auspices of General Petraeus.

The new “surge” strategy relied on 30,000 more American troops to “clear, hold, and build” in and around Baghdad so as to bring down the violence and thus give Iraqis a chance at political reconciliation. Fortunately, even before the “surge” started, it benefited from unexpected success in the western Iraqi province of Anbar, where the local population turned against Al Qaeda insurgents. But sadly, the political apparatus in Baghdad far from reconciling began to fall apart as Sunni and Shia leaders began to desert the Al-Maliki government at regular intervals throughout the spring and summer.

By its very definition, a surge is a temporary phenomenon and hence the gains that come with it can also be transitory. The pockets of peace that have been established in the tribal areas of Iraq should thus be celebrated with caution. These nomadic desert tribes have had a history of transient and shifting loyalties. Nonetheless, to maintain these gains on the periphery, a strong central uniting force is absolutely critical. If an Iraqi Prime Minister is incapable of holding the center, a lasting peace will never come to Baghdad, and Iraq will eventually break apart.

Prior to the much anticipated Petraeus Report to Congress on September 10th, a couple of other independent sources, such as the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Jones Commission also released their findings on post-surge Iraq. The GAO found that

“Iraq has failed to meet 11 of the 18 military and political objectives, or benchmarks, set by Congress and agreed on by Mr. Bush,”

according to a New York Times report dated September 4th. A couple of days later, Retired Marine Gen. James Jones presented his commission’s conclusions to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Per a NPR report,

“while Gen. Jones noted that there have been what he called ‘tactical successes’ with the U.S. troop surge, he said that Iraq remains torn by sectarian strife.”

Then, on the sixth anniversary of 9/11, General Petraeus testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee with his take on the “surge.” This is how ABC News reported one telling exchange between Senator John Warner and General Petraeus:

“Are you able to say at this time if we continue what you’ve laid before the Congress here as a strategy do you feel that is making America safer?” Warner asked.

“Sir, I believe that this is indeed the best course of action to achieve our objectives in Iraq,” Petraeus said.

“Does that make America safer?” Warner asked again.

“Sir,” Petraeus said, “I don't know actually.”

For having put General Petraeus in a position where he had to give such an answer, President Bush ought to feel ashamed. President Bush could not very well have made such a candid assessment himself, so he chose to hide behind General Petraeus. It is an even bigger shame that President Bush is thus politicizing our military by using its officers to effectively prolong his failed Iraq policy.

Following the 2006 mid-term elections and the subsequent Iraq Study Group report, President Bush made a gullible American public believe that his “surge” strategy would be different and its primary purpose would be to meet political objectives in Iraq. The “surge” has more or less given us the same old, same old. Nonetheless, President Bush and his die-hard supporters are intent on moving “forward to the past,” which is basically the same as “staying the course.” While the rest of us want to go “back to the future,” in which we could finally “give peace a chance.”

In an ironic case of real life imitating art, it is as if President Bush has all along been pleading with us not to “misunderestimate the strategery.” But seriously, how long can he muddle along in Iraq without further weakening our overstretched Army and Marines? How many more times are we going to hear that “the next six months are critical?” With no exit strategy in sight, when President Bush finally leaves office in January 2009, he is on track to leave behind not only a stalemate in Iraq, but also a broken military – that would be some legacy, indeed!